Russian invasion of Ukraine | Fewer tweets, more discussion
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In the latest episode of the United Hour Podcast, Nik (@Rood) is joined by CEO Duncan Drasdo and Financial Director Andy Green from the Manchester United Supporters Trust for a special episode on all things behind the scenes at Old Trafford including a brief history of MUST and their aims today, views on INEOS and Sir Jim Ratcliffe so far, and the Old Trafford regeneration.
I’m not talking about estimates given by different official sources. I’m talking about sensationalist articles where the name of the article contradicts or transforms the original meaning, for example (like the last one I’ve pointed you towards, although it was one of many):
Or simply random “news” from different random Twitter accounts that don’t even link to the original source of their information.
People use this thread to get relevant information on the matter and those who have thanked you for your contribution specifically mentioned that they don’t have the time to search for those news themselves. Sadly, this means that they’re unlikely to go and to fact-check each one of your links, which leads to them falling into the depth of speculation and misinformation — the most notable case would be all the news about Putin’s health.
The Guardian is accessible but those who are likely to read it are, most likely, not the ones that the propaganda wants to convince.
I can’t say that I watch it extensively but the main idea is (bear with me since the normal logic doesn’t apply past this point) that all of the devastation, murdered civilians and annihilated property was destroyed by Ukrainian Nazis that hold civilian population hostage, bomb Ukrainian cities (for a hardly understandable reason) and creates fakes like Bucha to blame Russia and tarnish its reputation world-wide. As I’ve said, it doesn’t even begin to make sense — the mythical Nazis are somehow fighting the Russian army & their own people simultaneously and succeed at both.
I doubt that any of us have the time or capacity to fact-check every link, and in any case speculation can not always be based on checkable facts. For example, there have been many news stories about Putin's health and/or his fate - all of them involving speculation to some degree. Should none of them be cited in your view? Or otherwise, who is to decide what should and what should not be cited?
As I've said, each viewer of this thread can decide for themselves what degree of plausibility to give each item: it should not be subject to your personal view as to what is "sensationalist".
And nor, as you've claimed, have I sensationalised anything. You may think that article is X is "sensationalist", but I have not made it so merely by citing its existence.
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With great relevance to Russia and Ukraine I recommend this podcast series (pre the current invasion) from the BBC:
"The Puppet Master is a series that gets to the bewildering heart of contemporary Russia by exploring the fortunes of a secretive, complicated and controversial man called Vladislav Surkov. Reporter Gabriel Gatehouse speaks fluent Russian and has access to a vast cache of leaked emails from Surkov’s Kremlin office. Using these, plus archive and sources gained over a decade of covering Russia and its wars, Gatehouse goes in search of the man pulling the strings. The journey is by turns dramatic, surprising and surreal, ranging from the battlefield to the theatre and the Kremlin itself. The destination? The post-truth world we inhabit today. "
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m0003js6
"The Puppet Master is a series that gets to the bewildering heart of contemporary Russia by exploring the fortunes of a secretive, complicated and controversial man called Vladislav Surkov. Reporter Gabriel Gatehouse speaks fluent Russian and has access to a vast cache of leaked emails from Surkov’s Kremlin office. Using these, plus archive and sources gained over a decade of covering Russia and its wars, Gatehouse goes in search of the man pulling the strings. The journey is by turns dramatic, surprising and surreal, ranging from the battlefield to the theatre and the Kremlin itself. The destination? The post-truth world we inhabit today. "
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m0003js6
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Long post incoming but relevant to the thread. I respect that you were willing to put this perspective out there and I do agree that some of the stuff coming from pro-Ukrainian twitter is total bonkers. I mean, the hysteria over demanding a NATO no-fly zone got out of control and was frankly, dangerous to the entire world. I equally chuckle at the number of posts from supposed "body-language experts" and psychologists about how Putin is deteriorating and on his death bed. Not to mention the supposed belief that a coup against Putin is going to take place
. This certainly reminds me of the Mueller investigation stuff as brought up by @2cents. There isn't much credible evidence behind any of this stuff and I think Putin was rational in the decisions he made, whether or not you agree with it.However, I do disagree with a number of claims you made. You somewhat downplay the war crimes by claiming there isn't much evidence to back them up, but there actually is video footage and images to show the type of animalistic pedophilia displayed by the Russian forces in Ukraine. We are talking newborns and toddlers and a video was taken of one case in action. It's so horrific that no one could possibly post that stuff on this forum, but I unfortunately have seen some of it, it's scarred me for life to be honest and it's hard to even type these words. There's also so much satellite, drone, and security camera footage now of citizens being summarily executed in Bucha and Irpin. That's why it's not hard to believe some of the other stuff coming out now, although I agree we should wait for credible sources to validate these claims.
From a military standpoint, if the Russian army was so effective, why could they not capture Kyiv or Odesa for that matter? Please name one prominent Western military analyst who thought Ukraine could survive as long as it did and that the Russian military would fold in 3 days, this claim is so laughably off the mark it's ridiculous. In fact, multiple hearings have taken place in the US Congress centered on blaming the Pentagon for how wrong they were in predicting the premature demise of Zelensky and Kyiv (not to mention the collapse of Afghan forces)! Biden gave Zelensky a satellite phone and pleaded with him to flee the capital as the invasion began.
With regards to current Russian military efforts, even the progress they are starting to make in Donbas is at least one month behind schedule and based on a reduction in aims from cutting off the entire Izyum/Donetsk salient to a smaller one centered around Severodonetsk. These are such small pieces of land, it's hard to take anyone seriously who argues this as a success for Russia, especially considering the scope of both the original invasion and current Donbas operation. I highly recommend anyone in this thread to read what Igor Girkin has been saying about the war, he's as fanatical as anyone in wanting Russia to annex Ukraine (and is quite detestable to Western audiences at least), but he clearly is not happy with the direction of the 'special operation' and wants full mobilization. It's also been reported pretty widely that Ukraine is taking its time to prepare for any major counter-offensive and they are spending weeks equipping and training new units, believing that their defenses will hold suitably to tire out Russian forces and then take the initiative. They clearly are trying to employ a similar strategy as what was seen in Kursk, remember in that battle the Wehrmacht actually made significant thrusts into the Kursk salient but the goal of the Soviets was to draw the attackers into numerous defensive lines and whittle them down to prepare for a subsequent summer counter-offensive. No one can predict what will end up happening and Western analysts are more inclined to hedge and claim that Ukraine will at best achieve a stalemate with no retaking of territory rather than get overconfident. However, the significant investment of Western military and economic resources means that any long-term conflict most certainly favors Ukraine. Putin's only hope is that the West grows tired of the conflict, which is always a possibility with the likes of Scholz and Orban in power. I don't include Macron as even though France will be difficult on EU accession and want to continue to communicate with Putin (which is not a bad thing really), they have sent some seriously good weapons systems to Ukraine.
I wouldn't count on Russia being able to outspend the West on this war, even with the energy concerns. $40 billion from the US is significant but less than 5% of the entire US defense budget. The US and West can outspend Russia on this war and still have plenty left over for what is the greater concern, China. There is a lot of energy to stop Russia on this one at least in the US (and UK from what I can tell) and at the end of the day, those countries are by and far the best armies in NATO. This war if anything has reduced the fear of Russia from a NATO perspective, maybe even to an alarming degree when considering the credible nuclear deterrent at play for Russia.
I think the biggest question mark has to do with the Ukrainian economy. The effects on the Ukrainian economy have been terrible in the short-term. However, this is an active area of discussion in the West and something that folks are trying to address. A significant part of $40 billion from the US actually is earmarked for economic assistance. Plus, if the Black Sea blockade went as far as to cause famine in poor countries, I don't think NATO would rule out sending assets to the Black Sea to escort merchant shipping, although I really hope this doesn't happen.
Finally, most economists I have read never claimed that the sanctions effects on Russia would take place immediately and instead explained that the effects would take many months to play out. The sanctions are targeted to go after certain individuals around the Kremlin plus high-tech supply chains for modern weapons like PGMs. The ruble crashing stuff was pure Twitter hype crap (although the strength of the Ruble is most certainly being manipulated considering the rules put in place by Nabiullina). Furthermore, China has not demonstrated the significant degree of support to Russia that would be needed to fully circumvent sanctions, it would have been obvious if this was really the case by now. After all, the West is more valuable economically to China, why would the Chinese mess up their own plans for hegemony when their goal is to split the US and EU? Honestly, EU gas purchases at increased prices are helping Russia more than anything now, the proposed oil embargo is a relatively small part of the pie. The Indian government is only acting out of fear that Russia will withdraw support for military hardware maintenance and support (along with some gratitude for help provided during the Cold War) and had this not been the case, India would have "peaced out" a long time ago. After all, guess where Modi is today.
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Fairly good if brief article about the war even if you don't like the paper.
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/is-ukraine-going-to-win-
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/is-ukraine-going-to-win-
@DT12 First of all, thanks for your perspective. I appreciate it and as you pointed out, it's definitely needed. I have the feeling that especially now that the frequency in which relevant news about the war are reported, people satisfy their hunger for information with less reliable Twitter sources.
Anyway, I still believe most readers of this thread are capable of accessing the quality of the source to at least some degree. People now to take the tweets about Putin being operated with multiple and large grains of salt for example. But there have also been posted many high quality reports and those tend to be more differentiated and not that onesided in their analyses. So here are a few things I'd like to hear your opinion on:
1) The size of Russia's military
Before the war, I've also heard the figure of 1.000.000. Once the war started, most sources claimed that the ~190k soldiers Russia deployed in Ukraine made up around 80% of their active forces. Forbes has the numbers as 280.000 in the Russian army, 900.000 totally in the military, 2.000.000 reserves but also mentioned that probably only 4.000 to 5.000 of those reserves are active.
Anyway, as I understood it, Russia can't deploy much more than the 190.000 they sent to Ukraine for various reasons. First, the losses so far affect many of their most important units, like e. g. paratroopers. They also already lost many high ranking Russian officers. And Russia itself admitted to sending conscripts to the war - which also points towards shortages of skilled personnel. On top of that, there have been many reports (also from hugely reliable sources like the British Ministry of Defence), most often documented by images, that Russia uses outdated equipment. And there is more than enough evidence that the equipment they have is often terribly maintained or at times even scavenged/unusable.
On top of that, they've already lost at least 20k men and even estimating the wounded conservatively that means that at least 25% of their initial forces are already out of order, probably closer to 40-60%. Is this really enough to even hold the occupied territories against insurgencies? And with the above in mind, can Russia really replace 50.000 - 100.000 soldiers? Especially considering the huge losses in equipment they suffered?
Of course they could produce those weapons which leads me to the next point..
2) The Russian economy
Russia has one tenth (!) of the EU's GDP and one thirteenth of the US'. And that was before the sanctions. Wars are very expensive and deploying more citizens to it will be an even greater burden for the economy. If this becomes a war of attrition, Ukraine has much more economic power to produce weaponry and ammunition behind them than Russia.
And that's not even considering the sanctions. I know that you believe they are ineffective but I really believe that is a opinion which is very hard to maintain. Even if you can bypass the sanctions over China and India, this will at the very least involve huge transactional costs. I believe the factthat two of the largest markets on earth want nothing to do with you and many businesses are pulling out of Russia or (try) boycotting you alone takes obviously a huge toll on your economy. And if it's not showing yet, it will definitely be showing in the future. And that's not even considering what will happen when the EU really becomes independent from Russian gas - because considering the wealth of the respective countries, we can take price increases much better than Russia. The fuel and energy sector of Russia makes up almost 25% of it's GDP. And you can't just sell your gas for a reduced price to China or India because you need pipelines or LNG terminals for that. What you're describing (that sanctions can't really be felt right now) might be correct but the predictions you're giving sound inaccurate and a bit naive to me.
3) The incompetence of Russia's military
This is also a huge one. There has been so much evidence that the Russian army lacks indepedendent thinking, logistic and strategic capabilities, motivation and suffers hugely from both corruption as well as failing flows of information due to filter bubbles and a bad failure culture. For this there are so many sources and examples that I don't even know where to start. The Russian forces have constantly bitten off more than they could chew. And they seemingly follow the inofficial doctrine that "what isn't allowed to be true can't and won't be true". From the 50 km convoy stuck in mud over the los of the Moskva to the failed river crossing - there are literally countless evidenced annecdotres of how rotten the Russian military is. Even the German chancellor publicly said that it is important to talk to Putin so that he gets to hear the truth.
All these things considered, where do you see the path to Russian victory?
Anyway, I still believe most readers of this thread are capable of accessing the quality of the source to at least some degree. People now to take the tweets about Putin being operated with multiple and large grains of salt for example. But there have also been posted many high quality reports and those tend to be more differentiated and not that onesided in their analyses. So here are a few things I'd like to hear your opinion on:
1) The size of Russia's military
Before the war, I've also heard the figure of 1.000.000. Once the war started, most sources claimed that the ~190k soldiers Russia deployed in Ukraine made up around 80% of their active forces. Forbes has the numbers as 280.000 in the Russian army, 900.000 totally in the military, 2.000.000 reserves but also mentioned that probably only 4.000 to 5.000 of those reserves are active.
Anyway, as I understood it, Russia can't deploy much more than the 190.000 they sent to Ukraine for various reasons. First, the losses so far affect many of their most important units, like e. g. paratroopers. They also already lost many high ranking Russian officers. And Russia itself admitted to sending conscripts to the war - which also points towards shortages of skilled personnel. On top of that, there have been many reports (also from hugely reliable sources like the British Ministry of Defence), most often documented by images, that Russia uses outdated equipment. And there is more than enough evidence that the equipment they have is often terribly maintained or at times even scavenged/unusable.
On top of that, they've already lost at least 20k men and even estimating the wounded conservatively that means that at least 25% of their initial forces are already out of order, probably closer to 40-60%. Is this really enough to even hold the occupied territories against insurgencies? And with the above in mind, can Russia really replace 50.000 - 100.000 soldiers? Especially considering the huge losses in equipment they suffered?
Of course they could produce those weapons which leads me to the next point..
2) The Russian economy
Russia has one tenth (!) of the EU's GDP and one thirteenth of the US'. And that was before the sanctions. Wars are very expensive and deploying more citizens to it will be an even greater burden for the economy. If this becomes a war of attrition, Ukraine has much more economic power to produce weaponry and ammunition behind them than Russia.
And that's not even considering the sanctions. I know that you believe they are ineffective but I really believe that is a opinion which is very hard to maintain. Even if you can bypass the sanctions over China and India, this will at the very least involve huge transactional costs. I believe the factthat two of the largest markets on earth want nothing to do with you and many businesses are pulling out of Russia or (try) boycotting you alone takes obviously a huge toll on your economy. And if it's not showing yet, it will definitely be showing in the future. And that's not even considering what will happen when the EU really becomes independent from Russian gas - because considering the wealth of the respective countries, we can take price increases much better than Russia. The fuel and energy sector of Russia makes up almost 25% of it's GDP. And you can't just sell your gas for a reduced price to China or India because you need pipelines or LNG terminals for that. What you're describing (that sanctions can't really be felt right now) might be correct but the predictions you're giving sound inaccurate and a bit naive to me.
3) The incompetence of Russia's military
This is also a huge one. There has been so much evidence that the Russian army lacks indepedendent thinking, logistic and strategic capabilities, motivation and suffers hugely from both corruption as well as failing flows of information due to filter bubbles and a bad failure culture. For this there are so many sources and examples that I don't even know where to start. The Russian forces have constantly bitten off more than they could chew. And they seemingly follow the inofficial doctrine that "what isn't allowed to be true can't and won't be true". From the 50 km convoy stuck in mud over the los of the Moskva to the failed river crossing - there are literally countless evidenced annecdotres of how rotten the Russian military is. Even the German chancellor publicly said that it is important to talk to Putin so that he gets to hear the truth.
All these things considered, where do you see the path to Russian victory?
Speculation is fine when it’s labeled as such. Not posting unproven claims by dubious often anonymous sources & separating it with genuine info (even if it’s biased) isn’t that hard, really, it’s simple informational hygiene.
Anyway, I’ve made my point, you’re free to post whatever you seem fit even if it devalues the overall quality of the thread.
How gracious of you. I'm sure that your complaining about my contributions to this thread has improved its quality enormously.
Polish government absolutely did realise that. This is just another instance of antagonising other european countries to try to boost their domestic polls.
Tha majority that I know either support the bunker rushist's actions or do not care at all.
I wouldn't worry too much about Russia's small gains in the east personally. They have been hammering this area since day 1, not just from when they 'said' they were focusing on it after being defeated in the North. They have actually made less progress here since their retreats elsewhere.
Even then, Ukraine have shown they are able to accept giving up ground. While Russia flatten residential areas, UA's overall strategy is to destroy Russia's capability to fight, this is what matters in the scheme of winning this war and the losses they have inflicted have been staggering, it is unsustainable for Russia, even if you take the most conservative estimates, whereas Ukraine only grows stronger.
It's silly to try and put timescales on it, but this is only going one way.
Even then, Ukraine have shown they are able to accept giving up ground. While Russia flatten residential areas, UA's overall strategy is to destroy Russia's capability to fight, this is what matters in the scheme of winning this war and the losses they have inflicted have been staggering, it is unsustainable for Russia, even if you take the most conservative estimates, whereas Ukraine only grows stronger.
It's silly to try and put timescales on it, but this is only going one way.
This whole thread has become kind of pointless for serious discussions. You have one user, who seemingly just clicks on Ukraine hashtags on Twitter and dumps half their contents here and another, who wants to make everything about Germany and together they make or influence like 2/3 of the posts. It's just way too low quality for a topic this serious.
Such countryside though... This is the road between Bakhmut and Lysychansk on the eastern front lines.
Yep. I stopped bothering with this thread because of Glaston and frostbite.
Possibly that Igor Sushko guy, who apparently was a race-car driver before realizing he was an expert on Russia, Ukraine, and warfare.
@DT12
Some very valid points and the narrative is indeed very skewed in this thread. However the sentences below don't correspond to any objective reality either.
Afghanistan ground down the USSR and they didn't have anywhere near the level of support Ukraine has. And Russia is not the USSR. Russia by the most conservative accounts has lost at least 15k soldiers in this conflict already and according to Ukraine it's double that to 30k. For perspective, the USSR lost under 15k soldiers in 10 years in Afghanistan. The war attrition is extremely high for Russia, it mathematically isn't sustainable. And while Ukraine's losses are either not reported or under-reported, this is a nation in full mobilisation and defence mode. So it will not run out of soldiers any time soon. The only worry is if they'll run out of Western financial support. Although they can still fight without it.
You say Russia will take the Ukraine "town by town" but considering the territorial gains and numerical losses in those last 3 months, that's simply not realistic. Town by town, at the current pace, means conflict for many years. And at this level of attrition, Russia simply cannot sustain this for many years. I can't put my finger on how long it can sustain for, I'm not an expert, but at a basic glance it's much less than the West can sustain what... 5% inflation? You think the democratic pressure against the cost of war in the West will pile up quicker than the pressure of 20k dead soldiers every 3 months for Russia?
Which brings us to the topic of territory. Your argument of "look how much Russia has taken in 3 months" rings quite hollow when Russia had taken more land at 1-month and 2-month checkpoints than now. Most of the territory had been captured in the opening blitzkrieg of the first month. They've been now pushed out of the north and north-east. For the past month Russia has been losing territory faster than it's been gaining it. You don't need be a mathematician to work out that tide of the conflict doesn't indicate a Russia territorial victory in the short or medium term.
The failure to acknowledge the above leads you to the opposite assumption to many of us. You say Ukraine cannot win. But with the current level of Russian losses, it's Russia that simply cannot win in the long term. Even if Ukraine were to run out of western support and money, so long as they are willing to fight they can still inflict high attrition upon the Russians until they get fed up and leave like they did in Afghanistan. Ultimately there is nation of 44m people there that does not want to be ruled from Moscow. It can't be controlled in the long term and even Moscow is beginning to realise that.
Some very valid points and the narrative is indeed very skewed in this thread. However the sentences below don't correspond to any objective reality either.
Afghanistan ground down the USSR and they didn't have anywhere near the level of support Ukraine has. And Russia is not the USSR. Russia by the most conservative accounts has lost at least 15k soldiers in this conflict already and according to Ukraine it's double that to 30k. For perspective, the USSR lost under 15k soldiers in 10 years in Afghanistan. The war attrition is extremely high for Russia, it mathematically isn't sustainable. And while Ukraine's losses are either not reported or under-reported, this is a nation in full mobilisation and defence mode. So it will not run out of soldiers any time soon. The only worry is if they'll run out of Western financial support. Although they can still fight without it.
You say Russia will take the Ukraine "town by town" but considering the territorial gains and numerical losses in those last 3 months, that's simply not realistic. Town by town, at the current pace, means conflict for many years. And at this level of attrition, Russia simply cannot sustain this for many years. I can't put my finger on how long it can sustain for, I'm not an expert, but at a basic glance it's much less than the West can sustain what... 5% inflation? You think the democratic pressure against the cost of war in the West will pile up quicker than the pressure of 20k dead soldiers every 3 months for Russia?
Which brings us to the topic of territory. Your argument of "look how much Russia has taken in 3 months" rings quite hollow when Russia had taken more land at 1-month and 2-month checkpoints than now. Most of the territory had been captured in the opening blitzkrieg of the first month. They've been now pushed out of the north and north-east. For the past month Russia has been losing territory faster than it's been gaining it. You don't need be a mathematician to work out that tide of the conflict doesn't indicate a Russia territorial victory in the short or medium term.
The failure to acknowledge the above leads you to the opposite assumption to many of us. You say Ukraine cannot win. But with the current level of Russian losses, it's Russia that simply cannot win in the long term. Even if Ukraine were to run out of western support and money, so long as they are willing to fight they can still inflict high attrition upon the Russians until they get fed up and leave like they did in Afghanistan. Ultimately there is nation of 44m people there that does not want to be ruled from Moscow. It can't be controlled in the long term and even Moscow is beginning to realise that.
And most of that was tactically conceded by Ukraine to take up superior defensive positions, i.e. it wasn't ground out. That was possibly a Ukrainian mistake.
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Watching this russian soldier getting life in prison, is this a good strategy for ukraine while the war is still ongoing? Won't the russians do similar things to captured russian soldiers?
As opposed to?
Im not sure Russia is capturing its own soldiers - though I guess that could explain their performance to date?
Also if anybody is guilty of war crimes regardless of which side they are on then they should face justice
With the exception of various uncontested areas in the south, the map and timeline appears to show the Russian invasion going in reverse. Or perhaps we're only getting one side of the story from the totalitarian, propagandist western media ?
A lot of what Ukraine took back in the north was also tactically conceded though, when it became clear to Russia that they weren't go to advance any further and holding said ground would come at too high a price. Both sides have struggled to advance where both sides have committed forces. Unfortunately, the fighting is in Ukraine though, so both sides aren't staking equally. It's difficult to have any concept of Ukraine winning this. As long as Russia is more than happy to throw its minorities into the meat grinder to occupy Ukraine, they may well make an acceptable trade.
I don't know if "life" actually means "for life" in the Ukrainian penal code. But the fact that he pleaded guilty and expressed regret ought to have given him some leniency (but still a long prison sentence, obviously).
It is a good strategy to conduct trials while the war is ongoing. Russian soldiers need to know that there are consequences for their actions.
Why?
Sure, Putin conceded the north because he realized he couldn't win there and wanted to spare himself the international humiliation of not being able to take Kyiv. He took a break to move troops to the east and south only to be repelled out of Kharkiv. He finally got Mariupol after the remaining Ukrainians agreed to leave the steel plant. So all things said, he has a patch of land in the south with little to no chance of getting Odesa. The same thing that happened in the north and Kharkiv will probably happen around Kherson as soon as the Ukrainians reorient their efforts in the south with fresh NATO weapons.
It certainly won't influence Russian judicial system (I assume that you've meant captured Ukrainian soldiers?). Or even the "international tribunal" that probably will try Azov soldiers (it seems like the trial will happen on DNR's ground, which means that death penalty is also an option).
The only chance for captured POW is prisoner exchange, not a lighter sentence.
I hope so, but I'm more sober on a lot of this than some of you are. My fear, literally since the first week or ten days of the invasion as I posted here, was that Russia wouldn't gain that much more territory and instead would take a small amount in the south, then just bed in. That would be a big loss for Ukraine, even if they hold Odesa and some of the coast. Right now, I'm not convinced Ukraine will be able to liberate Kherson and wipe out the other Russian gains along the south cost and in Donbas.
I don't think the conditions are right for them to entrench themselves in places in Kherson given that the people clearly don't want them there and Ukrainian side are likely to launch a massive offensive in the south once they rearm. There's little the Russians will be able to do when fighting both the local population and a highly armed Ukrainian military.
Like father like son. Soldiers are stealing washing machines, their superiors are stealing tons of grain.
The grim thing is that both armies seem to be doing much, much better at defending than they are at offensive actions. And it looks like Russia is doing much better tactically now than they did at the very beginning (although it's hard not to). My only hope at this point is that the internal system will eventually crumble under the immense pressure — when common folk will recognise just how costly this war had been to them, both financially and in terms of very literal human lives.
Totally different types of "tactically conceding".
Ukraine conceded the south bank of the Dnipro river without putting up any resistance. Same for protecting the border with Belarus on the north. The Russians took Kherson without any resistance. Ukrainians set up their resistance around Kyiv and Mykolaiv. They conceded land but protected lives where they felt they couldn't realistically defend territory (rightly or wrongly).
By contrast, Russia committed huge forces to the North campaign and only "tactically conceded" there after a bloody 6-week effort to siege Kyiv where they took in huge casualties. That's more of a defeat than "tactically conceding" to be honest. Not in the war, but in the battle for sure.
I agree. It's tough to say Ukraine is winning while cities are getting pulverised, civilians are dying and domestic grain production is blockaded by the Russian fleet.
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4000 vehicles... and that's just the visually recorded ones.
Waiting for the end of the war when normally pows are let go.
Obviously I meant ukranians. I'm questioning the timing, nothing else. It may cause some of their own soldiers captured unnecessary reprisal.
I meant ukranians of course. My point is that they may now say these aren't pows, they're war criminals and give them heavy sentences instead of being exchanged or released at the end of the war.
Fair enough, I just fear it will lead to unfair "revenge" on ukrainian pows.
And why would you let that guy go?
If you still get the harshest possible punishment, why would any of the following hundreds of POWs awaiting trial do the same?
This is what they’re going to do anyway, at least according to how the things look at the moment. Although there haven’t been any open trials yet (Azov’s soldiers are probably going to be the first).