Russia Discussion

Can I see the videos of Russian tanks deployed in Crimea?

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A tank blocking the road into Crimea.

http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/05/world...e-possible-outcomes/index.html?iref=allsearch

Video contains heavy APCs at around 1:55 with a turret gun.

And since I'm at work and can't be bothered to look more:

 
Countries in being hypocrites when it comes to their foreign policy. Shocking!!

By that logic then US should stop supplying weapons and other stuff to Pakistan aswell since they're so vehemently opposing this by Russia.

Not disagreeing with you there. They're all hypocrites who disregard human rights when it suits them. What differs is the extent of it all. Russia, considering the state of its internal and foreign policy, manages to be even worse than the US in both regards.
 
Just catching up on the latest news now, 30,000 Russians in Crimea now and Turkey are scrambling fighter jets to the black sea coast. US destroyer in the area too? What is this lunacy? What is happening?
 
Just catching up on the latest news now, 30,000 Russians in Crimea now and Turkey are scrambling fighter jets to the black sea coast. US destroyer in the area too? What is this lunacy? What is happening?

The Destroyer is no big deal, more symbolic then anything else, it alone would not last long in an armed conflict and unless it is carrying nukes (which would not be used anyways) couldn't do much damage to Russian forces.

Turkey just expressing their displeasure by shuffling some forces around. If they ever leave Turkish airspace it will be surprising.
 
The Destroyer is no big deal, more symbolic then anything else, it alone would not last long in an armed conflict and unless it is carrying nukes (which would not be used anyways) couldn't do much damage to Russian forces.

Turkey just expressing their displeasure by shuffling some forces around. If they ever leave Turkish airspace it will be surprising.

Will be interesting to see what happens after this referendum thing they are holding.
 
To be fair, we don't know that the Destroyer is the only US Navy ship in the Black Sea. It's just the only visible one.

The destroyer is a part of NATO's anti-ballistic missile shield since Russia got its panties in a bunch over the systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.
 
Just catching up on the latest news now, 30,000 Russians in Crimea now and Turkey are scrambling fighter jets to the black sea coast. US destroyer in the area too? What is this lunacy? What is happening?
Is this 30,000 number accurate? Or is it just conveniently chosen to be more than the 25,000 number stated in the treaty between Russia and Ukraine?

I think I read somewhere that the US destroyer is on a pre-planned mission/exercise, and has nothing to do with the latest developments in Ukraine, but not 100% sure.

I don't think there would be any confrontations. No side wants that (apart from the current Ukrainian government). The EU is actually even divided on imposing real economic sanctions on Russia, and the US seems to have toned down that threat as well. The US will try to use this to score some points against Russia though, and try use that to isolate them in the future.
 
One of the best articles I've read so far

https://news.vice.com/articles/why-putin-will-get-everything-he-wants-in-crimea

Even before the Crimean parliament voted unanimously today to ask Moscow for permission to become a part of Russia, Russian forces had all but completed the process of establishing a new reality on the ground in Crimea — that the region simply isn’t under the control of the central Ukrainian government in Kiev anymore. And so, barring a major military response by the Ukrainian Army or a massive Russian excursion into Eastern Ukraine, it looks like Putin’s end game is about to unfold.

Many analysts have made mention of the Russian naval base at Sevastopol and how, as Russia’s main warm-water naval installation, it is of key importance to Russia. Negotiations with Ukraine over Russia's continuing operation of the base have gotten tense in the past, although a 2010 agreement gave Russia a lease until 2042.

Just to be safe, however, Russia has been quietly building a potential replacement at Novorossiysk, a commercial port a couple hundred miles east that has the notable distinction of actually being in Russia. It could house the Black Sea Fleet if Russia were to lose Sevastopol, and further expansion of naval facilities there could reduce or even eliminate Russian dependence on Crimea.

If the Russian Navy stays in Sevastopol, and Crimea stays in Ukraine, Ukraine would almost certainly be blocked from joining NATO. Ukraine has been trying to join for years to protect itself from… well, from this. However, a country can’t join NATO if it has a foreign military base on its soil. So, if Russia stays in Sevastopol and Crimea stays in Ukraine, it means Ukraine can’t join NATO. This is a positive for Russia, because it makes it easier to lean on Ukraine in the future, especially if Kiev gets a little too buddy-buddy with Europe.

A Crimean vote on whether or not to join Russia is now scheduled for March 16. If Crimeans vote in favor of it, there’s a chance the region could become a “frozen territory,” typically the result of a cease-fire announcement during hostilities, which freezes boundaries to match areas of military control. Frozen countries are usually considered by much of the world to be under military occupation, and few such zones ever receive formal diplomatic recognition as independent states. This is what happened in the aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, which gave birth to the Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Those zones are recognized as countries by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Tuvalu, and no one else — aside, of course, from other frozen states.

The frozen-state scenario would put the West in a delicate position. If the West were to recognize Crimean independence, it would open the gates for a closer Ukraine-NATO relationship thanks to Sevastopol no longer being an issue. But it would do so at the risk of ticking off Ukrainians by legitimizing Crimea’s secession. If the West were to make a stand and refuse to recognize what will inevitably be billed as Crimea's “legitimate democratic vote of determination” for independence, it would do so at the risk of putting a legal barrier between itself and Ukraine thanks to Sevastopol still being an issue.

In addition, if the West recognizes Crimea, it creates a more complex situation regarding diplomatic recognition of all the other frozen territories that have been hatched out of Russian military intervention: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. This could serve to help usher in a new 21st Century form of conflict, in which moving a border via invasion is highly discouraged, but chipping off a chunk of a country in the name of self-determination is fairly acceptable. That debate will be very relevant as the international community decides how to move forward with ethnic separatists following the creation of new countries like East Timor and South Sudan.

When it comes down to it, the few diplomatic carrots that the West is willing offer or withhold from Russia have only as much value as Putin is willing to assign them. His ability to not give a shit exceeds the West's capacity to do anything he gives a shit about. The fact is that Russia cares a lot more about Crimea than anybody else does — except for Ukraine.

And that's not to mention the two cards Putin has yet to play. The first: He could cripple the already-fragile European economy. Europe is heavily dependent on Russian gas and oil to keep the lights on, and Putin can cut it off — about 40 percent of Europe’s oil and gas supply — with a phone call. The global economic consequences from that would be ugly.

The second: Efforts to get Bashar Assad to come to heel and to convince Iran to ditch its nuclear-weapons program are basically doomed without Putin’s help. (Though to be fair, the prospects for both of these negotiations are pretty grim anyway.) Without any Russian support, the US would probably have to chalk both efforts up as losses.

And so the question becomes whether the West cares more about a worldwide economic downturn, Syrian chemical weapons, and Iranian nukes — or about a historically prickly peninsula in the Black Sea full of people who, however misguidedly, sound like they'd rather be Russians anyway.

Many in the West have been making some grievous miscalculations in framing these events. Wonk chatter has been about preventing further escalation, reducing tensions, and providing an “off-ramp” allowing Putin to back down. Some talking heads have tried to stuff these events into a traditional nation-vs.-nation, Cold War mold. Others have tried to attribute the ineffectiveness of the Western response to the fact that Putin is insane. These approaches do little but make Westerners feel better about themselves.

The reality is that Crimea is all but a done deal. Putin saw something he wanted and an opportunity to take it. So he sent in troops and set about establishing that new reality on the ground. The bulk of negotiations in the coming days and weeks will involve Western officials trying to prove that Russia hasn’t gotten the better of them — the “compromise” reached will be almost exactly what Putin wanted all along, in the guise of a diplomatic victory preventing an armed conflict — so they can try to preserve Western credibility. They know they'll need it for the next crisis that comes along.

kinda liked the bolded part :)
 
Not the most insightful article. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would be Putin's worst nightmare as they would fall under article V, which of course he doesn't want. It would also allow western forces to be based in Ukraine, which again would ratchet up the Russian security dilemma just as the Czech missile shield did. If Ukraine loses Crimea, it will be a blow to their perceived territorial integrity, but it could also be a blessing in disguise as it would inescapably bring the Ukrainian Government closer to the west.
 
This treaty thing keeps getting brought up, but in reality the treaty allows for troops on certain bases in Crimea and gives them some freedom of movement for self-defense, it doesn't give them carte blanche to move around Crimea whenever and whereever they want, taking control of infrastructure, etc. So since no credible threats were made towards the safety of the Russian bases or troops (not even Putin has tried to pretend there were), any troop movements outside of their bases can't really fall under the treaty.

Now unless all these troops and vehicles are as Putin claims "local militia" but if that is the case there is no point for anyone to mention the treaty since it would not apply to the "local militia."
 
Not the most insightful article. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would be Putin's worst nightmare as they would fall under article V, which of course he doesn't want. It would also allow western forces to be based in Ukraine, which again would ratchet up the Russian security dilemma just as the Czech missile shield did. If Ukraine loses Crimea, it will be a blow to their perceived territorial integrity, but it could also be a blessing in disguise as it would inescapably bring the Ukrainian Government closer to the west.

Certainly this is the whole point of the American adventure in Ukraine. Why else would they want to meddle in their internal affairs, invest in their opposition etc. Tighten the grip around Russia.
 
This treaty thing keeps getting brought up, but in reality the treaty allows for troops on certain bases in Crimea and gives them some freedom of movement for self-defense, it doesn't give them carte blanche to move around Crimea whenever and whereever they want, taking control of infrastructure, etc. So since no credible threats were made towards the safety of the Russian bases or troops (not even Putin has tried to pretend there were), any troop movements outside of their bases can't really fall under the treaty.

Now unless all these troops and vehicles are as Putin claims "local militia" but if that is the case there is no point for anyone to mention the treaty since it would not apply to the "local militia."

Putin can justify his move through his intention to protect the ethnic Russians. It actually turned out better this way, one can argue, as the movement of Russian troops served as a deterrent for the Ukrainian military. Literally prevented them from taking any action on the ground too hastily.
 
Putin can justify his move through his intention to protect the ethnic Russians. It actually turned out better this way, one can argue, as the movement of Russian troops served as a deterrent for the Ukrainian military. Literally prevented them from taking any action on the ground too hastily.


yes that is his claim, but in terms of the treaty that gets mentioned, well it is an action not allowed by the treaty. So more to the point, it just goes to show that the treaty really has nothing to do with this situation and can't be used as any sort of justification.
 
yes that is his claim, but in terms of the treaty that gets mentioned, well it is an action not allowed by the treaty. So more to the point, it just goes to show that the treaty really has nothing to do with this situation and can't be used as any sort of justification.

I think it does help a lot. Otherwise it would have been a full blown invasion. This way it has actually helped de-escalating things. Last thing we all needed was some right-wing Kyev nutcase stirring up some shit down in Crimea and provoking a Russian reaction.
 
I think it does help a lot. Otherwise it would have been a full blown invasion. This way it has actually helped de-escalating things. Last thing we all needed was some right-wing Kyev nutcase stirring up some shit down in Crimea and provoking a Russian reaction.

Well assuming some right wing Kiev nutcase was actually going to stir up some shit, I guess. But still it leaves the Russian actions, as being actions not actually allowed by the treaty, so the treaty doesn't really have much to do with what is going on.
 
Not the most insightful article. If Ukraine joins NATO, it would be Putin's worst nightmare as they would fall under article V, which of course he doesn't want. It would also allow western forces to be based in Ukraine, which again would ratchet up the Russian security dilemma just as the Czech missile shield did. If Ukraine loses Crimea, it will be a blow to their perceived territorial integrity, but it could also be a blessing in disguise as it would inescapably bring the Ukrainian Government closer to the west.
Two important things to remember here..

1- If Crimea joins Russia, other parts of Eastern Ukraine might follow suit, and if that didn't happen then Ukraine might still face years of unrest in the future.
2- Ukraine is not only close to Russia because of Crimea, but also because of its dependence on Russia economically. They can't go full mad on Russia, at least in the near future.

IMO, Ukraine was always going to lean towards the West eventually (because the West look determined to do that).. However by doing it this way, they might have lost more than they wanted if indeed Crimea and even worse other parts of Eastern Ukraine joined Russia. I think the importance of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (both economically and strategically) for Russia, outweighs basically just losing an ally in the region.

And by the way, I don't think a war against Russia is on the cards in the foreseeable future, so the missile shield won't be that important compared to winning very important parts of Ukraine.
 
yes that is his claim, but in terms of the treaty that gets mentioned, well it is an action not allowed by the treaty. So more to the point, it just goes to show that the treaty really has nothing to do with this situation and can't be used as any sort of justification.
The treaty allows the presence of Russian troops on Crimean soil. Protecting the Russians in Crimea fulfils the justification for action. So basically both are needed to justify the involvement of the Russian troops.
 
The treaty allows the presence of Russian troops on Crimean soil. Protecting the Russians in Crimea fulfils the justification for action. So basically both are needed to justify the involvement of the Russian troops.


Not according to the article that was linked in this thread the other day, it allows for troops on the bases and it allows for freedom of action in protecting those bases.

And of course it still comes down to whether there was any credible threat IN CRIMEA (remember we are talking about IN CRIMEA) to those ethnic Russians who live in Crimea. We all know a good deal of unrest took place in Kiev but it had not seem to have spread into the Crimea.


Though I guess it all depends on how you define a threat. Is it just something that could possibly happen or does it have to have an immediate chance of happen, some kind of urgent threat.
 
How the Ukraine crisis ends

By Henry A. Kissinger, Published: March 5
Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.

Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.

Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.

Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia’s borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.

The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709, were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet — Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.

The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.

The Ukrainians are the decisive element.They live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939 , when Stalin andHitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 percent of whose population is Russian , became part of Ukraine only in 1954 , when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other — as has been the pattern — would lead eventually to civil war or break up. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West — especially Russia and Europe — into a cooperative international system.

Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years; it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders have not learned the art of compromise, even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor Yanukovych and his principal political rival, Yulia Tymoshenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. A wise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.

Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.

Putin should come to realize that, whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington. Putin is a serious strategist — on the premises of Russian history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S. policymakers.

Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:

1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.

2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.

3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.

4. It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possible to put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.

These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for that will come soon enough.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html

Eugene Robinson: The U.S. credibility problem in the Ukraine crisis

Robert Ortung and Christopher Walker: Authoritarian regimes retool media control

Stephen J. Hadley and Damon Wilson: Putin’s long game

Eliot A. Cohen: Putin’s power play in Ukraine

Zbigniew Brzezinski: How to respond to Putin’s aggression

David J. Kramer: U.S. foreign policy coming home to roost
 
Not according to the article that was linked in this thread the other day, it allows for troops on the bases and it allows for freedom of action in protecting those bases.

And of course it still comes down to whether there was any credible threat IN CRIMEA (remember we are talking about IN CRIMEA) to those ethnic Russians who live in Crimea. We all know a good deal of unrest took place in Kiev but it had not seem to have spread into the Crimea.


Though I guess it all depends on how you define a threat. Is it just something that could possibly happen or does it have to have an immediate chance of happen, some kind of urgent threat.
Exactly. It's basically how you interpret the treaty, and the definition of a threat. But either way, both the treaty and the presence of Russians inside Crimea are necessary to be able to justify the deployment of the troops there.
 
4. It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea.
If the people in Crimea want that, then I think it is possible. That is basically how South Sudan was formed. If South Sudan now wants to unite with Ethiopia, what's in the international laws that goes against it?
 
If the people in Crimea want that, then I think it is possible. That is basically how South Sudan was formed. If South Sudan now wants to unite with Ethiopia, what's in the international laws that goes against it?

I think he's pretty vague talking about the 'rules of the existing world order'. We had a few recent examples, Kosovo, and Sudan as you mention, where one could conclude rules were ignored and broken.
 
Exactly. It's basically how you interpret the treaty, and the definition of a threat. But either way, both the treaty and the presence of Russians inside Crimea are necessary to be able to justify the deployment of the troops there.

Well they provide a way to spin one sides arguement that much is true that I will agree with you on. Doesn't really necessary make it right or the truth.

http://themoscownews.com/news/20140303/192276993/Crimea-crisis-Role-of-Russias-Black-Sea-Fleet.html (this was posted by another user and it doesn't really seem to indicate the Russians have by treaty, the complete freedom of movement and action in the Crimea that some would claim)
 
Russia’s 25,000-troop allowance & other facts you may not know about Crimea

http://rt.com/news/russian-troops-crimea-ukraine-816/
Point 9 is interesting:

Russian naval units are permitted to implement security measures at their permanent post as well as during re-deployments in cooperation with Ukrainian forces, in accordance with Russia’s armed forces procedures.

This other bolded part sounds kind of important. During re-deployments, ie movement from base to another or movement from Russia to the base or from the base back to Russia, they can implement security measures. That to me indicates that during movements they can provide security , which is reasonable.

That article is also interesting because of the act it says sparked this all

Authorities in the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea – where over half the population is Russian – requested Moscow’s assistance after the self-proclaimed government in Kiev introduced a law abolishing the use of languages other than Ukrainian in official circumstances.

For some that may seem like a imminent threat, others not so much.
 
This other bolded part sounds kind of important. During re-deployments, ie movement from base to another or movement from Russia to the base or from the base back to Russia, they can implement security measures. That to me indicates that during movements they can provide security , which is reasonable.

That article is also interesting because of the act it says sparked this all



For some that may seem like a imminent threat, others not so much.
Not only the Crimean authorities, but they have a written letter as well from Yanukovych himself in which he asked Russia to help maintain security in Crimea (after the clashes in Kiev). Russia (as well as many local authorities in Ukraine) do not recognize the new Ukrainian government.
 
Not only the Crimean authorities, but they have a written letter as well from Yanukovych himself in which he asked Russia to help maintain security in Crimea (after the clashes in Kiev). Russia (as well as many local authorities in Ukraine) do not recognize the new Ukrainian government.

did those letters come before or after he had actually left the Ukraine? I thnk even Putin knows this guy is no longer and won't be again any sort of representative of the Ukrainian Govt. Funny that he would only ask for help in the Crimea and not in the places where the actual clashes were taking place, you know where Ukrainians on both sides of the issue were actually being injured and killed.
 
did those letters come before or after he had actually left the Ukraine? I thnk even Putin knows this guy is no longer and won't be again any sort of representative of the Ukrainian Govt. Funny that he would only ask for help in the Crimea and not in the places where the actual clashes were taking place, you know where Ukrainians on both sides of the issue were actually being injured and killed.
Because the Russian troops aren't allowed in the other parts of Ukraine according to the treaty.

By the way, Yanukovych is the last democratically elected president of Ukraine. It's not difficult not to recognize a self-proclaimed government after ousting an elected president by force.
 
The BBC are saying that Russian troops have seized a military base in Sevastopol, no shots are reported to have been fired.
 
I suppose India supports a Pakistani intervention in Kashmir, then.

Or the other way round, considering Kashmir was a princely state which CHOSE to join India and Pakistan essentially occupied half of it through an intervention in 47-48

Ironically Nehru went to the UN hoping for a legitimate solution - instead of taking things into his own hands
 
Because the Russian troops aren't allowed in the other parts of Ukraine according to the treaty.

By the way, Yanukovych is the last democratically elected president of Ukraine. It's not difficult not to recognize a self-proclaimed government after ousting an elected president by force.

The treaty doesn't allow them to take control of the Crimea either and yet........

But you brought up Yanukovych's request for help, why would he just ask for help in an area that had seen little or no violence? Makes no sense if you actually think about it. I mean if he is the legit leader he can ask for help in any part of the country he wants and certainly it would make more logical sense to ask for help in areas actually experiencing violence. If you actually think about it that is.
 
The treaty doesn't allow them to take control of the Crimea either and yet........

But you brought up Yanukovych's request for help, why would he just ask for help in an area that had seen little or no violence? Makes no sense if you actually think about it. I mean if he is the legit leader he can ask for help in any part of the country he wants and certainly it would make more logical sense to ask for help in areas actually experiencing violence. If you actually think about it that is.
Because the government that took over has anti-Russian agenda, and that's why he expected tensions and may be even violence in the areas with Russian majority.
 
I think he's pretty vague talking about the 'rules of the existing world order'. We had a few recent examples, Kosovo, and Sudan as you mention, where one could conclude rules were ignored and broken.
The international court justice in Hague disagrees with you (ironically, after Serbia processed the request in UN) ;)
 
The international court justice in Hague disagrees with you (ironically, after Serbia processed the request in UN) ;)

It's about the questions of borders and sovereignty etc. Seems to be quite a fluid concept. Territorial sovereignty depends, surprise surprise, on the choice of your allies.
 
Or the other way round, considering Kashmir was a princely state which CHOSE to join India and Pakistan essentially occupied half of it through an intervention in 47-48

Ironically Nehru went to the UN hoping for a legitimate solution - instead of taking things into his own hands

Of course. Or even the British. Or China. That's the point. Russia may have a legitimate claim to Crimea, but so do Ukraine and the Crimean Tatars as well. Who decides - referendum? Better to just let it be.

Entering with military forces is not legitimate unless there's a humanitarian crisis going on (i.e. genocide).
 
It's about the questions of borders and sovereignty etc. Seems to be quite a fluid concept. Territorial sovereignty depends, surprise surprise, on the choice of your allies.
Completely agree about the second part. If Russia wouldn't have defeat Turkey, Serbia wouldn't get half of the Kosovo Vilayet (Treaty of San Stefan)and if Balkan Coalition wouldn't have defeated Turkey later then in London conference Serbia wouldn't get the other half (which it lost almost a century later, after the war crimes and genocide it did in Kosovo).

That wasn't my main point here though. While sovereignty is important, it is even more important the right for self determination. Which is the reason why I back the Crimea people if they want to not be part of Ukraine anymore. Why should people be victims in an international law which anyway contradicts another one? Laws are supposed to make life more easy for people.
 
Completely agree about the second part. If Russia wouldn't have defeat Turkey, Serbia wouldn't get half of the Kosovo Vilayet (Treaty of San Stefan)and if Balkan Coalition wouldn't have defeated Turkey later then in London conference Serbia wouldn't get the other half (which it lost almost a century later, after the war crimes and genocide it did in Kosovo).

That wasn't my main point here though. While sovereignty is important, it is even more important the right for self determination. Which is the reason why I back the Crimea people if they want to not be part of Ukraine anymore. Why should people be victims in an international law which anyway contradicts another one? Laws are supposed to make life more easy for people.

Oh dear, here we go with this crap again. Also, convenient that you would start Kosovo's history in the 19th century ignoring that we have by name and faith settled in Kosovo in the 12th century already and the seat of our king and church was in Kosovo.

Don't bother responding as I've heard it all before, the kingdom of Dardania and the Illiri etc.
 
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