I don't think anyone is arguing the US is not looking to advance its own interests. All states are. The point is that in certain situations, states do act with a degree of altruism where their actions don't necessarily benefit them in any substantial way, other than to help others. The examples naturalized noted are a few, and I would also add as an example states who donate substantial money, aid, and resources to help victims of earthquakes, floods, Tsunamis, and most recently finding the Malaysian flight underwater.
Russia Discussion
- Thread starter iSparky
- Start date
-
In the latest episode of the United Hour Podcast, Nik (@Rood) is joined by CEO Duncan Drasdo and Financial Director Andy Green from the Manchester United Supporters Trust for a special episode on all things behind the scenes at Old Trafford including a brief history of MUST and their aims today, views on INEOS and Sir Jim Ratcliffe so far, and the Old Trafford regeneration.
I don't think anyone is arguing the US is not looking to advance its own interests. All states are. The point is that in certain situations, states do act with a degree of altruism where their actions don't necessarily benefit them in any substantial way, other than to help others. The examples naturalized noted are a few, and I would also add as an example states who donate substantial money, aid, and resources to help victims of earthquakes, floods, Tsunamis, and most recently finding the Malaysian flight underwater.
A paltry degree of altruism in $$ terms (frequently boosted by individual charity) when set against state investment in operations for strategic US advantage.
Ok, but it does exist. The argument that states only act on behalf of their own interests is not particularly complete, as it can't explain why they often contribute to things where that seemingly don't benefit their "strategic interests".
It's 100% complete for the US. The fact that they chuck a few dimes around for PR doesn't change the fundamentals. I'll have to quote Kennan again: US foreign policy is nothing to do with 'freedom' or 'democracy' but IS about 'maintaining the advantage in the US standard of living'.
Quoting someone from the cold war still doesn't explain why the US gave aid to earthquake victims, tsunami victims, and an entire laundry list of other beneficiaries over the years who wouldn't benefit the US's strategic interests in any way. At the end of the day, there are instances where this happens and it flies directly in the face of the myopic argument that all states are egoists and all their actions are exclusively done to gain advantage. Like everything else, there are inconvenient exceptions.
It's insignificant PR chaff not an exception in any meaningful sense. cf $3Bn given to Israel per annum.
Last edited:
How do you know its PR ? It could be that certain states feel compelled to help people in need when there is nothing to be gained by doing so.
US as bleeding heart 
- I've heard it all now. You won't even give your own poor people affordable health care. Just look at the USAID strategic goals:
Strategic goal 1
Strengthen America’s economic
reach and positive economic
impact
Strategic goal 2
Strengthen America’s foreign policy
impact on our strategic challenges
- I've heard it all now. You won't even give your own poor people affordable health care. Just look at the USAID strategic goals:Strategic goal 1
Strengthen America’s economic
reach and positive economic
impact
Strategic goal 2
Strengthen America’s foreign policy
impact on our strategic challenges
Last edited:
US as bleeding heart
We're getting off topic here Pete.
Well I don't think so, it's just widening the context (and you pointedly ignored the unarguably on topic points).
The way I see it, states can behave in more than one way, which has been proven in the previous examples cited. There's really no way to obscure such a simple point.
They can but if the balance of funds is flowing massively one way it isn't an alternate behaviour in any meaningful way. That's an even simpler point.
Even if the there's a ridiculous imbalance, that doesn't mean it's not a relevant point. Its not unusual for Democratic states to come to the aid of countries in need, usually because of public sentiment that supports such actions; irrespective of whether or not the given state stands to strategically gain anything from it.
You have no idea what you're talking about.
I was born and spent most of my life in Russia. Read hundreds of materials on WW2 and knew plenty of people who took part in it. Just because you dug up something out of your own ass and present it as a fact, doesn't make it so. There was plenty of research done on that subject and what you state here is not supported by most of them.
So, WWIII or no WWIII?
Personally I think history clearly shows we here in the US have never stopped being at war since WWII. So maybe it's not WWIII because it's still WWII.
Personally I think history clearly shows we here in the US have never stopped being at war since WWII. So maybe it's not WWIII because it's still WWII.
Ah okay, so tens of Western and Soviet historians, journalists and published books is me pulling facts out of my own ass because of your 'hundreds of materials of WW2. Kool.
Also, apparently living and being born in Russia makes you know more about Russian history. feck me, I must know more about British history than American historians then. Are you denying Stalin refused the red cross access to German held Soviet POW's?
Are you denying Stalin's relocation and slaughter in Gulags of ethnic minorities?
Don't be so hard on yourself. I'm pretty sure you managed to spend 1957 without bombing anyone. 2000 too, come to think of it.
And, uh...yeah... that's about it, actually.
We've never really gotten over that, we're quite worried as a result the world will think that our leaders have small penises.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulrod...ifferent-people-spy-bystander-heroic-surgeon/Fantastic. Yet the Putin fanboys in this thread suggest it's the Western media that's broadcasting lies.
Last edited:
This is some crazy sh!t. I wonder what Ukranians think, I don't really trust any media outlet or government to give me an honest view.
Anyone want to weigh in on how likely it would be for Ukraine to accept being split in two effectively? Or would the west of Ukraine go to war with the east first in your opinion?
Anyone want to weigh in on how likely it would be for Ukraine to accept being split in two effectively? Or would the west of Ukraine go to war with the east first in your opinion?
It's exactly what Putin has been aiming for the entire time. He's put his "green men" in the east to facilitate unrest and organize groups of cossacks and others. Because the Ukrainian military will not attack them, despite being horrible Nazi psychopaths according to Putin, the government has no means of dealing with them. In addition to the Russian "green men" on the ground, they've orchestrated a blitz of bullshit in the media making Eastern Ukraine look like a warzone to garner support in Russia and in the east against the Ukrainian government. They show gunfights that didn't happen, a "victim" in hospital wards, massive protests that are rebranded footage of the Maidan protesters to inflate the number of people involved, etc. Then someone tried to kill the mayor of Kharkiv, who was Yanukovych's ally but has recently become more pro-Ukraine. That will only galvanize support amongst pro-Russians, while also potentially getting rid of an influential pro-united Ukraine politician.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/04/28-nuanced-views-eastern-ukraine-pifer-thoburn
An interesting article on the public opinion of southern and eastern Ukraine. The majority of people in the regions oppose joining Russia, believe that Russia is illegally meddling in its affairs, and oppose the occupations by Putin's "green men" and cossacks.
An interesting article on the public opinion of southern and eastern Ukraine. The majority of people in the regions oppose joining Russia, believe that Russia is illegally meddling in its affairs, and oppose the occupations by Putin's "green men" and cossacks.
Can't say I'm surprised. Eastern and southern Ukraine (as well as Crimea) were peaceful before Putin's covert campaign to invade Ukrainian territory with his special forces. Everything coming out of Russia on this issue seems to be a big lie at the moment.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-mayday-idUSBREA400E620140501
First May Day parade in Red Square since the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin handed out a Stalin-era award today that he revived last year, and he's going to have the first post-Soviet military parade through Red Square on the 9th. Glory days!
And the Ukrainian military is moving on Slavyansk. If there are no special forces involved, it won't end well for the OSCE hostages the Russians have taken. Given their origin though, I wouldn't be surprised if there were foreign special forces going in to rescue them.
First May Day parade in Red Square since the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin handed out a Stalin-era award today that he revived last year, and he's going to have the first post-Soviet military parade through Red Square on the 9th. Glory days!
And the Ukrainian military is moving on Slavyansk. If there are no special forces involved, it won't end well for the OSCE hostages the Russians have taken. Given their origin though, I wouldn't be surprised if there were foreign special forces going in to rescue them.
Last edited:
I wonder if Nato or the US or whoever have any intention of aiding the Ukraine on the ground if things escalate to full blown warfare.
I don't think Putin will start a full blown military attack, I think he'd take the eastern 1/3 or so of the Ukraine with minimal fuss and stop there.
I don't think the 'west' will want to get involved in anything beyond small 'in-and-out' operations in the east of the Ukraine, surely they couldn't hold any territory without a full blown assault.
I suspect the 'west' will settle for alienating Putin for now, they have gone from minimal influence in the Ukraine to having a pro-western government, they're the ones who have 'won' so far. If Putin manages to hold onto some of Ukraine it will come at a huge cost to him, where before he had great influence in all of Ukraine.
I don't think Putin will start a full blown military attack, I think he'd take the eastern 1/3 or so of the Ukraine with minimal fuss and stop there.
I don't think the 'west' will want to get involved in anything beyond small 'in-and-out' operations in the east of the Ukraine, surely they couldn't hold any territory without a full blown assault.
I suspect the 'west' will settle for alienating Putin for now, they have gone from minimal influence in the Ukraine to having a pro-western government, they're the ones who have 'won' so far. If Putin manages to hold onto some of Ukraine it will come at a huge cost to him, where before he had great influence in all of Ukraine.
I think Putin is a dumb ass, soon or later all the countries using their gas are going to find other suppliers and next year US will be able to mass export LNG to Europe. Anyway the news aren't good and we have deaths from both sides, for a small piece of land Russia will lose in a long term.
Yes he is an idiot. Squandering a chance for Russia to fully integrate into the global economy by deciding to be a nationalist and play power politics with energy resources. Suppose it can't come as a surprise when a former KGB Colonel is running the show in Russia.
He has completely overplayed his hand and irrespective of how this mess ends, will never be trusted again.
So, it's kicking off in Odessa now. Another key port and region that would help connect Russia to Transnistria. Unlike in the east, there's active pro-Ukrainian resistance to the pro-Russians/Russians. As the polls demonstrated, most in the east and south don't want to join Russia but won't do anything to stop it.
Heh. A family member was in Odessa last year. She said the tension in the air was palpable. Like, scary palpable.
I was there last summer and didn't notice anything. Probably a bit early before all the tension with Kiev started.
Maybe she is exaggerating post factum? Because I was there last summer too and it was the same old Odessa as usual - maybe she just didn't get the city vibe though.
Perhaps I guess. I suppose she could just have gone into the 'wrong areas' and got a bad vibe.
39 people die after radicals set Trade Unions House on fire in Ukraine's Odessa.
http://rt.com/news/156480-odessa-fire-protesters-dead/#
http://rt.com/news/156480-odessa-fire-protesters-dead/#
Last edited:
Here's an interesting piece on what is going on in Ukraine.
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/30/russia-ukraine-war-kiev-conflict?CMP=twt_gu
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/30/russia-ukraine-war-kiev-conflict?CMP=twt_gu
The threat of war in Ukraine is growing. As the unelected government in Kiev declares itself unable to control the rebellion in the country's east, John Kerry brands Russia a rogue state. The US and the European Union step up sanctions against the Kremlin, accusing it of destabilising Ukraine. The White House is reported to be set on a new cold war policywith the aim of turning Russia into a "pariah state".
That might be more explicable if what is going on in eastern Ukraine now were not the mirror image of what took place in Kiev a couple of months ago. Then, it was armed protesters in Maidan Square seizing government buildings and demanding a change of government and constitution. US and European leaders championed the "masked militants" and denounced the elected government for its crackdown, just as they now back the unelected government's use of force against rebels occupying police stations and town halls in cities such as Slavyansk and Donetsk.
"America is with you," Senator John McCain told demonstrators then, standing shoulder to shoulder with the leader of the far-right Svoboda party as the US ambassador haggled with the state department over who would make up the new Ukrainian government.
When the Ukrainian president was replaced by a US-selected administration, in an entirely unconstitutional takeover, politicians such as William Hague brazenly misled parliament about the legality of what had taken place: the imposition of a pro-western government on Russia's most neuralgic and politically divided neighbour.
Putin bit back, taking a leaf out of the US street-protest playbook – even though, as in Kiev, the protests that spread from Crimea to eastern Ukraine evidently have mass support. But what had been a glorious cry for freedom in Kiev became infiltration and insatiable aggression in Sevastopol and Luhansk.
After Crimeans voted overwhelmingly to join Russia, the bulk of the western media abandoned any hint of even-handed coverage. So Putin is now routinely compared to Hitler, while the role of the fascistic right on the streets and in the new Ukrainian regime has been airbrushed out of most reporting as Putinist propaganda.
So you don't hear much about the Ukrainian government's veneration of wartime Nazi collaborators and pogromists, or the arson attacks on the homes and offices of elected communist leaders, or the integration of the extreme Right Sector into the national guard, while the anti-semitism and white supremacism of the government's ultra-nationalists is assiduously played down, and false identifications of Russian special forces are relayed as fact.
The reality is that, after two decades of eastward Nato expansion, this crisis was triggered by the west's attempt to pull Ukraine decisively into its orbit and defence structure, via an explicitly anti-Moscow EU association agreement. Its rejection led to the Maidan protests and the installation of an anti-Russian administration – rejected by half the country – that went on to sign the EU and International Monetary Fund agreements regardless.
No Russian government could have acquiesced in such a threat from territory that was at the heart of both Russia and the Soviet Union. Putin's absorption of Crimea and support for the rebellion in eastern Ukraine is clearly defensive, and the red line now drawn: the east of Ukraine, at least, is not going to be swallowed up by Nato or the EU.
But the dangers are also multiplying. Ukraine has shown itself to be barely a functioning state: the former government was unable to clear Maidan, and the western-backed regime is "helpless" against the protests in the Soviet-nostalgic industrial east. For all the talk about the paramilitary "green men" (who turn out to be overwhelmingly Ukrainian), the rebellion also has strong social and democratic demands: who would argue against a referendum on autonomy and elected governors?
Meanwhile, the US and its European allies impose sanctions and dictate terms to Russia and its proteges in Kiev, encouraging the military crackdown on protesters after visits from Joe Biden and the CIA director, John Brennan. But by what right is the US involved at all, incorporating under its strategic umbrella a state that has never been a member of Nato, and whose last elected government came to power on a platform of explicit neutrality? It has none, of course – which is why the Ukraine crisis is seen in such a different light across most of the world. There may be few global takers for Putin's oligarchic conservatism and nationalism, but Russia's counterweight to US imperial expansion is welcomed, from China to Brazil.
In fact, one outcome of the crisis is likely to be a closer alliance between China and Russia, as the US continues its anti-Chinese "pivot" to Asia. And despite growing violence, the cost in lives of Russia's arms-length involvement in Ukraine has so far been minimal compared with any significant western intervention you care to think of for decades.
The risk of civil war is nevertheless growing, and with it the chances of outside powers being drawn into the conflict. Barack Obama has already sent token forces to eastern Europe and is under pressure, both from Republicans and Nato hawks such as Poland, to send many more. Both US and British troops are due to take part in Nato military exercises in Ukraine this summer.
The US and EU have already overplayed their hand in Ukraine. Neither Russia nor the western powers may want to intervene directly, and the Ukrainian prime minister's conjuring up of a third world war presumably isn't authorised by his Washington sponsors. But a century after 1914, the risk of unintended consequences should be obvious enough – as the threat of a return of big-power conflict grows. Pressure for a negotiated end to the crisis is essential.
That might be more explicable if what is going on in eastern Ukraine now were not the mirror image of what took place in Kiev a couple of months ago. Then, it was armed protesters in Maidan Square seizing government buildings and demanding a change of government and constitution. US and European leaders championed the "masked militants" and denounced the elected government for its crackdown, just as they now back the unelected government's use of force against rebels occupying police stations and town halls in cities such as Slavyansk and Donetsk.
"America is with you," Senator John McCain told demonstrators then, standing shoulder to shoulder with the leader of the far-right Svoboda party as the US ambassador haggled with the state department over who would make up the new Ukrainian government.
When the Ukrainian president was replaced by a US-selected administration, in an entirely unconstitutional takeover, politicians such as William Hague brazenly misled parliament about the legality of what had taken place: the imposition of a pro-western government on Russia's most neuralgic and politically divided neighbour.
Putin bit back, taking a leaf out of the US street-protest playbook – even though, as in Kiev, the protests that spread from Crimea to eastern Ukraine evidently have mass support. But what had been a glorious cry for freedom in Kiev became infiltration and insatiable aggression in Sevastopol and Luhansk.
After Crimeans voted overwhelmingly to join Russia, the bulk of the western media abandoned any hint of even-handed coverage. So Putin is now routinely compared to Hitler, while the role of the fascistic right on the streets and in the new Ukrainian regime has been airbrushed out of most reporting as Putinist propaganda.
So you don't hear much about the Ukrainian government's veneration of wartime Nazi collaborators and pogromists, or the arson attacks on the homes and offices of elected communist leaders, or the integration of the extreme Right Sector into the national guard, while the anti-semitism and white supremacism of the government's ultra-nationalists is assiduously played down, and false identifications of Russian special forces are relayed as fact.
The reality is that, after two decades of eastward Nato expansion, this crisis was triggered by the west's attempt to pull Ukraine decisively into its orbit and defence structure, via an explicitly anti-Moscow EU association agreement. Its rejection led to the Maidan protests and the installation of an anti-Russian administration – rejected by half the country – that went on to sign the EU and International Monetary Fund agreements regardless.
No Russian government could have acquiesced in such a threat from territory that was at the heart of both Russia and the Soviet Union. Putin's absorption of Crimea and support for the rebellion in eastern Ukraine is clearly defensive, and the red line now drawn: the east of Ukraine, at least, is not going to be swallowed up by Nato or the EU.
But the dangers are also multiplying. Ukraine has shown itself to be barely a functioning state: the former government was unable to clear Maidan, and the western-backed regime is "helpless" against the protests in the Soviet-nostalgic industrial east. For all the talk about the paramilitary "green men" (who turn out to be overwhelmingly Ukrainian), the rebellion also has strong social and democratic demands: who would argue against a referendum on autonomy and elected governors?
Meanwhile, the US and its European allies impose sanctions and dictate terms to Russia and its proteges in Kiev, encouraging the military crackdown on protesters after visits from Joe Biden and the CIA director, John Brennan. But by what right is the US involved at all, incorporating under its strategic umbrella a state that has never been a member of Nato, and whose last elected government came to power on a platform of explicit neutrality? It has none, of course – which is why the Ukraine crisis is seen in such a different light across most of the world. There may be few global takers for Putin's oligarchic conservatism and nationalism, but Russia's counterweight to US imperial expansion is welcomed, from China to Brazil.
In fact, one outcome of the crisis is likely to be a closer alliance between China and Russia, as the US continues its anti-Chinese "pivot" to Asia. And despite growing violence, the cost in lives of Russia's arms-length involvement in Ukraine has so far been minimal compared with any significant western intervention you care to think of for decades.
The risk of civil war is nevertheless growing, and with it the chances of outside powers being drawn into the conflict. Barack Obama has already sent token forces to eastern Europe and is under pressure, both from Republicans and Nato hawks such as Poland, to send many more. Both US and British troops are due to take part in Nato military exercises in Ukraine this summer.
The US and EU have already overplayed their hand in Ukraine. Neither Russia nor the western powers may want to intervene directly, and the Ukrainian prime minister's conjuring up of a third world war presumably isn't authorised by his Washington sponsors. But a century after 1914, the risk of unintended consequences should be obvious enough – as the threat of a return of big-power conflict grows. Pressure for a negotiated end to the crisis is essential.
I think there are 2 very important points people should consider when evaluating the crisis:
1. In Russia the public opinion of Putin is that he's too soft. People with a more profound understanding of Russian culture will understand what I'm saying. So a lot of what Putin is doing is purely for his own internal political reputation in Russia.
2. Russia is no longer a military force. 2 decades of neglect means they are no longer the military superpower they were in Soviet times. Yes, they still have a significant military. But, it's by no means certain that Russia would be capable of winning a war against the Ukraine. And a war against the NATO countries would be suicide. AND Russia does not have the financial capabilities to withstand any kind of large scale land war, it would bankrupt Russia.
1. In Russia the public opinion of Putin is that he's too soft. People with a more profound understanding of Russian culture will understand what I'm saying. So a lot of what Putin is doing is purely for his own internal political reputation in Russia.
2. Russia is no longer a military force. 2 decades of neglect means they are no longer the military superpower they were in Soviet times. Yes, they still have a significant military. But, it's by no means certain that Russia would be capable of winning a war against the Ukraine. And a war against the NATO countries would be suicide. AND Russia does not have the financial capabilities to withstand any kind of large scale land war, it would bankrupt Russia.
What?
1. No way he is being seen like soft here. He passed this stage after the "We will corner the terrorists in the toilet and wipe them out" press-conference, which was in 1999 or in 2000, I think. He is the manliest man in the whole world, Kim Irs kind of figure almost. He stands against the corrupt America and all the rotten West that don't want our country to be great once again - and he frightens them when they hear him talking the hard truth about the international relations.
2. Russia still has about 750 000 of manpower and an incredible amount of money thrown into the army budget every year. No way that Ukraine can match that - neither could've Georgia earlier. It wouldn't be enough against NATO, of course - 80% of the war equipment is from the soviet times, but the Ukraine can do literally nothing against it, considering the civil war (I think we can say that this is civil war already).
I still don't understand what NATO and USA are going to do. And I really think/fear/hope, I don't know, that they're going to let this slide. An open full-time war can still result into the nuclear one - nobody could realistically imagine that right now, but who could've imagine that Russia would really invade the Ukraine? The risks is too high and they have they economical levers to play with.
Btw, I thought that he was doing all this Crimea thing for his reputation inside the country too, his ratings are going insanely high and he managed to disguise the crisis after the Olympic Games into the "economical sanctions from the West", turning the thing that would potentially hurt him to the thing that affects national pride (and created an external enemy).
But this Slavyansk/Donbass mess... I don't know anymore why he is doing that. Maybe it just went out of control
But this Slavyansk/Donbass mess... I don't know anymore why he is doing that. Maybe it just went out of control
Its quite clear why he is doing it. He wants to to claim Russia speaking areas in Ukraine as part of Russia.
The article reads like a half throughout advocacy piece for Putin's policy. No mention of Russia's instigation of this mess through over a decade of bullying the Ukrainians through energy threats and now invasions and land grabs, and how such actions drew the US and Europe into getting involved.